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Let me thank Peter Fenves for his kind invitation as well as all of you for 
coming today. I would also like to thank the Department of German and 
Department of Religious Studies and Jewish Studies Program for their hospitality 
and willingness to hear and perhaps accept such a specific, yet therefore no less 
complicated topic as is the one before us. Why this topic and why this topic now? 
And indeed, why in this way? Allow me to offer a few reasons: the first is mine 
alone – I am participating in a project of writing a detailed commentary for the 
Star of Redemption – a kind of reader. Before us is the chapter on which I worked. 
(The book will be published next month, before the international Rosenzweig 
congress, held in Jerusalem this year.) At the same time, I have a nearly complete 
manuscript on the theory of the institution, which is why it is in focus today. The 
second reason, perhaps the main justification I am here is that texts or books of 
this period (the Star was published in 1921) might only be readable in this form. 
Peter and I have recently participated in a similar project of joint reading of Walter 
Benjamin’s Zur Kritik der Gewalt, which was also published in 1921. It could be 
that there is a connection between the German language in which they were 
written and the Judaism of their authors. There seems to be a tension or border 
within which it might be possible to thematize or translate Judaism by 
philosophical or German means (or instruments). And vice versa, of course. I 
2 
 
would immediately like to claim that the complexity of these texts lies not only 
in the encounter of ‘the German’ and ‘Jewish’, about which much has already 
been written, but also in the simultaneous thematization of war and violence, the 
meaning of the state and the state of Israel (Zionism and anti-Zionism), and left, 
communist, Bolshevik ideas, espoused in one way or another by the various 
authors of this time. We encounter a similar situation today among those who do 
not necessarily write in German, but are certainly philosophers who tackle the 
issue of thematization of Judaism (such as Michael Walzer). The third reason 
could refer to the importance of such texts for the development of a relatively 
new philosophical discipline, that of social ontology, followed by a decisive 
rapprochement of analytic and continental philosophical traditions. Without 
thematizing entirely disparate concepts we find in this chapter of Rosenzweig’s 
book, such as ‘community’, ‘life’, ‘institution’, ‘Wir’, or the relation ‘war-
pacifism’, it is completely impossible to think the origin of social facts or social 
acts, and thus social epistemology. Rosenzweig’s relevance (and Banjamin’s, 
Buber’s, Löwenthal’s) for social ontology would thus be added to the already 
existing interest for the sociology of Simmel, Durkheim, and the interest in texts 
on the community by Husserl, Edith Stein, Gerd Walther and Adolf Reinach. 
Sociology and phenomenology would thus be joined by a kind of quasi social 
philosophy or political sociology.  
In the first book of the third part of the Star of Redemption (Stern der 
Erösung), entitled “The Fire or The Eternal Life,” we find, similar to the rest of 
the books, the problem of a difference between the 1921 and later editions. The 
first was published during Rosenzweig’s lifetime, whereas Nahum D. Glatzer 
published the second edition, allegedly in accordance with Rosenzweig’s 
instructions, in 1930, shortly after his death, complete with appendices and 
chapter titles. It would appear that of all the translations into various languages 
(the most recent was into Russian, appearing in 2017), only the second English 
translation follows the first edition, although the translator, Barbara E. Galli, 
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retains the titles and subtitles in the margins, so as to facilitate reading. In the first 
publication of Stern, the book here in question is 47 pages long [SE1, 375-421] 
and is divided into 60 chapters. Eight of the 60 are capitalized, with the first letter 
of the book, ‘G’ (“Gepriesen sei…”), larger than the other seven (E, W, W, D, I, 
E, U). Overall Stern has only 76 capitalized chapters, each book usually having 
one, seven or eight. Considered in the context of the whole volume, it might 
appear as if Rosenzweig’s careful calculation yields the word GEWW (Hebraic 
for ‘from within’ or ‘inside’, or else ‘from the community’ or ‘from the home’) 
or DIEU, but this is rather wrongheaded. Of the eight capitalized units in this 
part1 (the longest of which is a page and a half long), the first and last play the 
role of introduction, that is, conclusion to the book. Meaning that six are 
particularly emphasized in Glatzer-Rosenzweig’s intervention. But two units, 
numbers 5 and 6, capitalized in the first edition have ‘reduced significance’ in the 
second: “Soziologie der Gemeinschaft: das Mahl” and “Soziologie des Ganzen: 
der Gruss” – without the same emphasis as the other six.  
How should we read this complicated book? To begin with, what does 
Rosenzweig wish to achieve with the book and its title, what does he introduce 
in his introduction? The practice of Judaism in eternity or in eternal life is 
supposed to be described as a blaze. Yet, the flame (Flamme) or “the heart of the 
fire” (das Kernfeuer) is special indeed, since it has to burn such that it is never 
extinguished but always fueled of itself (it needs nothing, it burns nothing other 
than itself). This pure flame is outside time, regenerates itself and overcomes all 
forms of time, above all the past and future – in the name of the eternal now. 
                                                 
1 The eight are: Die Verheisung der Ewigkeit (The Promise of Eternity) [SE1 375; SE 331; SG 317]; 
Das Ewige Volk: jüdisches Schicksal (The Eternal People: Jewish Destiny) [SE1 375-383; SE 331-339; 
SG 317-324]; Das eine Volk: jüdisches Wesen (The One People: Jewish Essence) [SE1 384-387; SE 
339-342; SG 324-327]; Das heilige Volk: das jüdisches Jahr (The Holy People: The Jewish Year) [SE1 
388-395; SE 342-349; SG 327-334]; Soziologie der Gemeinschaft: das Mahl (Sociology of The 
Community: The Meal) [SE1 395-403; SE 349-357; SG 334-341]; Soziologie des Ganzen: der Gruss 
(Sociology of The Whole: The Greeting) [SE1 404-412; SE 357-364; SG 341-347]; Die Völker der 
Welt: Messianische Politik (The Peoples of The World: Messianic Politics) [SE1 412-420; SE 364-371; 
SG 348-354]; Der Ewigkeit der Verheisung (The Eternity of The Promise) [SE1 420-421; SE 371-372; 
SG 354-355]. 
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Rosenzweig thematizes time within Judaism several times in the book; the 
formulation at the top of this chapter, which begins with “Indem so die heilige 
Gesetzeslehre” (Since teaching of the Holy Law) [SE1 382; SG 323], is not 
specially marked in the second edition [SE 338] yet is probably the most precise. 
“The Jewish people does not calculate the years of its own chronology.” Life in 
time is forbidden to the Jewish or holy people, for the sake of eternal life in the 
eternal now. This is life beyond time or life that does not pass.  
To all the better explain these complex structures comprising several rather 
complicated terms (time, eternity, life, and on the side, self-sustaining fire), 
throughout the book Rosenzweig distinguishes everything concerning what is 
‘Jewish’ (people, law, language, war, time, etc.) from everyone else (Christianity, 
other peoples, peoples of the world, etc.). The book, “The Fire or The Eternal 
Life” is above all a “book of distinctions,” helping to clarify often complicated 
constructions. Thus, Rosenzweig differentiates a community based on blood from 
one grounded in spirit, will and hope [SE1 376; SE 332; SG 317]. In contrast with 
Christian peoples, the Jewish people never finds its roots in the land on which it 
stands [SE1 376; SE 332; SG 318]. As opposed to others, it never identifies itself 
with the language it speaks [SE1 379; SE 334; SG 324].2 Rosenzweig poses the 
problem of borders, since the Jewish people “can then no longer enclose itself 
within borders, but it must include the borders within itself” [SE1 384; SE 339; 
SG 325]. Finally, in contrast with the peoples of the world [die Völker der Welt], 
the reality of the Jewish people is already realized [SE1 413; SE 365; SG 348], 
etc. 
                                                 
2 Rosenzweig brings the second unit to a triumphant close thus: “We alone cannot imagine this sort of 
time; for everything in which the existence of peoples takes root, has long ago been taken away from 
us; land language, custom and law long ago departed from the sphere of the living and for us is raised 
from the living to the holy; but we, we are still living and live eternally. Our life is no longer interwoven 
with anything external, we have taken root in ourselves, without roots in the earth, eternal wanderers 
therefore, yet deeply rooted in ourselves, in our own body and blood. And this rooting in ourselves and 
only in ourselves guarantees our eternity for us” (in uns selbst schlugen wir Wurzel, wurzellos in der 
Erde, ewige Wanderer darum, doch tief verwurzelt in uns selbst, in unserm eignen Leib und Blut. Und 
diese Verwurzelung in uns selbst und allein in uns selbst verbürgt uns unsre Ewigkeit). [SE1 383; SE 
338-339; SG 324]. 
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The entire construction of this book and its meaning could really be an 
answer to two questions at the beginning of the third unit: “But what does that 
mean – rooting in ourselves (Verwurzelung im eigenen Selbst)? What does it mean 
that here an individual or a people seeks the guarantee of its survival (seines 
Bestehens) in nothing external, and precisely here, precisely in its absence of 
relationship (Beziehungslosigkeit), wants to be what is eternal” [SE1 384; SE 339; 
SG 324]? How, then, is an entity constructed or self-constructed? By what means 
and deploying which strategy, can it be made to be beyond all connection with 
anything else, yet still last forever and surpass all else? Rosenzweig is here trying 
to constitute an entirely new “social ontology,” in opposition to Hegel’s 
institutionalism and his state-grounding project in general.3 Simultaneously 
working on Stern and his doctoral thesis on Hegel, while also being a participant 
in one of the most terrible wars in history – thus, Hegel (philosophy), Judaism, 
and war are the first three elements of Rosenzweig’s project, which intertwine, 
sometimes entirely chaotically, in the book – his intention is to systematize a few 
concepts that could explain the eternal life of a community. Yet, before that, is it 
possible to quickly formulate the nature of Rosenzweig’s institutionalism and its 
novelty? What is it that he does? I think that the first premise could be that 
Rosenzweig opposes the institution and state4 (Hegel’s state, but not only his) 
with the house. “The chamber of the Jewish heart is at home” [SE1 410; SE 362; 
SG 346], and it is in the home that begins and ends “the struggle against death” 
(in the previous section he speaks about marriage and sexual difference).5  
                                                 
3 Later, in a letter to Martin Buber of 3 July 1925, Rosenzweig pens a complicated sentences that 
describes the terrible travails of the struggle against institutions in which he condenses his efforts to 
remain consistent and uncover all the dangers of institutionalism contained in the Jewish heritage. “The 
struggle against institutions takes all too breath-drainingly long for the tempestuous breath of the 
prophet” (Kampf gegen Institutionen ist eine viel zu langatmige Sache für den Sturmatem des Profeten). 
[GS2 1050]. 
4 In his 1920 lecture, “Der Jude im Staat,” complete with his reservations towards Zionism, Rosenzweig 
insists that the state in or for Jews was “nicht lebendig.” “Der Jude muss im Staat sein, weil der Staat 
nicht im Juden sein kann.” [GS3 554]. 
5 In the following, third, book of Stern, “Die Strahlen oder der ewiger Weg,” Rosenzweig is even more 
precise: “Das ewige Volk ruht schon im Hause des Lebens; die Völker der Welt bleiben auf dem Weg” 
[SE1 471; SE 397; SG 346]. 
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Franz Rosenzweig speaks of institutions in which there is no life. In two 
different places in his texts (from the second half of 1919), he presents the 
confrontation between life and the institution, the house and the institution, all 
the while (pro)claiming a new institution that is to be an alternative to the 
university. (He founded his ‘counter-institution’, “Lehrhaus Forschungsinstitut” 
in Frankfurt in 1920.) What, then, is a house for Rosenzweig? It ought to protect 
life and be separated from the city, just as dwelling out to be separated from other 
city activities. 
 
We can no longer wish to remain naked people. We look ‘backward’, but not 
in a way for us to sacrifice our living life to the image of the holy institution 
that destroys life. No, the institution may only be house, we must know and 
render true that we are more than an institution, a living Jewish people. (Wir 
können heute nicht mehr nackte Menschen bleiben wollen. Wir sehen 
“zurück” aber nicht so, dass wir unser lebendiges Leben wieder dem 
lebenzerstörenden Bild einer heiligen Institution opfern würden. Nein, die 
Institution darf uns nur Haus sein, wir müssen es wissen und wahrmachen, 
dass wir mehr sind als die Institution, lebendige jüdische Menschen).6  
 
This passage – from a lecture note – appears as the reconstruction of a 
fragment from a letter to Rudolf Ehrenberg (of 17 August 1919). In both the letter 
and the lecture, Rosenzweig goes back and forth. In the letter, he writes: 
 
I do not understand how someone can persist in petrifying people into 
institutions. We are otherwise happy when able to revive the institution. Here 
too is real, living, true life good enough to be built into the corner stone of 
the institution, yet for which no one knows when or even whether it will be 
built (Ich begreife nicht wie man daran hängen kann, Menschen zu 
Institutionen zu versteinern. Sonst ist man froh, wenn man Institutionen 
menschlich beleben kann. Und hier ist ein wirkliches, lebendiges, 
tatsächliches Leben grade gut genug dazu, in den Grundstein einer 
Institution eingemauert zu werden, von der keiner weiss, ob überhaupt und 
wenn, wie sie gebaut werden wird).7 
                                                 
6 This is a note for the lecture “Lessings Nathan” Rosenzweig held at the end of December 1919. [GS3 
450]. 
7 [GS2 640]. 
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The institution stands in opposition to life (Rosenzweig first separates them, 
speaking of the ‘naked’ Institution and naked man), turns life to stone; yet this 
simultaneously announces the possibility of life not only capable of reviving the 
institution, but also able to a priori be in the background and in the foundation of 
some institutions which do not yet exist, which are yet to come, which we await. 
“We are otherwise happy when able to revive the institution” (Sonst ist man froh, 
wenn man Institutionen menschlich beleben kann). The institution is not only 
capable of preserving life (not only ought it protect life), but the reverse is also 
true: we are the ones capable of preserving the life of the institution, to announce 
its new life and revive it, to expect it entirely new and alive.  
It seems to me that the idea that we alone (Wir allein), our very own common 
life can constitute a home or an entirely new institution that has all the 
characteristics of a new and living house (one that does not petrify us, nor that 
we petrify and move away from). This is the beginning of Rosenzweig’s 
engagement in whose service are all the concepts he uses.8 At the very beginning 
of this book, Rosenzweig anticipate the first person plural, ‘We’ (a pronoun 
almost never thematized in the history of Western thought), and this is the 
introduction into the construction of a community or reconstruction of an eternal 
community. Indeed, this is the basic theme of this book. Rosenzweig needs to 
show what it is that holds this community together or what binds us all into one 
entity, which as such is a priori outside time. The pronoun ‘Wir’ appears at the 
beginning of the book in quotations marks, as part of the phrase ‘Wir sind ewig’, 
referring to generational transmission, from grandparent to grandson. ‘We’ thus 
refers to a blood community, to eternity, common language, and a future that 
                                                 
8 Life is actually the unconditional condition of all that exists, the first concept and the concept that 
holds all other concepts in order as it constructs it. There is no better sentence about life than the one 
Rosenzweig writes in the conclusion of the third unit dedicated to “Jewish Essence:” “Aber das 
lebendige Leben fragt ja nicht nach dem Wesen. Es lebt. Und indem es lebt, beantwortet es sich selbst 
alle Fragen, noch ehe es sie stellen kann.” [SE1 387; SE 342; SG 327]. 
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affirms the present. Later in the text, Rosenzweig uses ‘Wir allein’ several times. 
In unit six, in which he writes about sin, Wir transforms into a very compact 
community equated with humanity or mankind (Manschheit), that is, Israel.9 This 
shift from a speech act to sin that closely binds the individuals of a community 
into Israel is entirely new and surprising. 
Constructing ‘Wir’ or the phrase “Wir sind ewig” is the axle that holds all 
other concepts together, giving place to all concepts in a stable order. The various 
concepts could be divided into a few groups. The first set would include the 
already mentioned first and crucial articles that determine the difference between 
Judaism and Christianity. They eminently determine what is Judaism: it is a 
‘people’ (‘chosen’, ‘holy’, ‘first’ – these attributes have complementary function), 
it is ‘blood’, always opposed to ‘will’ and ‘spirit’, it is (holy) ‘language’ and 
writing, it is (holy) ‘law’, and finally, ‘land’ or ‘territory’, which implies “Israel.” 
Everything Rosenzweig wrote at the time with regard to land and territory would 
today certainly demand complete revision, in the context of the newly-formed 
state of Israel. Nevertheless, however much the contemporary reader finds 
Rosenzweig’s anti-Zionism hard to understand and perhaps too aggressive and 
decadent, a hundred years or even seventy years since the founding of Israel, I 
find his conclusions and arguments still inspiring indeed. 
The following group of terms simultaneously directs and revises all the 
terms, and in a particular way confirms the self-construction of the ‘We-axle’ or 
pure flame: this is ‘time’ or the uses of time and understanding of time always in 
harmony with eternity. (Rosenzweig insists on an annual cycle that ensures 
Judaism its eternity; he then further processes all the crucial holy days that 
regenerate and hold the people together; finally, he constantly mentions the 
‘present’ and ‘now’, which reflect eternity by excluding the temporality of time.) 
The group further includes the term ‘border’, thematized ingeniously in only one 
                                                 
9 In his 1922 lectures, published as “Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen,” Rosenzweig returns to the Wir. 
“Mein Ich wird Wir. Im Wir sehe ich mich gleichzeitig von aussen und von innen” [GS3 650]. 
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place in the book, but further developed in his geopolitical texts from the last 
period of the war. (A sort of theory of the border in Rosenzweig is a combination 
of three different sources: Hegel – whose variations on Schranke and Grenze are 
crucial for understanding his logic and his system in general; Rosenzweig’s 
experience as soldier studying maps and thinks borders in the context of crossing, 
shifting, fluidity; and Rosenzweig the Talmudist, translator and reader of the 
world text, always distinguishing and separating significance and meaning.) 
Finally, the last term in this unit is ‘Messiah’ (“the future of the Messiah, which 
is surely drawing near”10) and ‘messianism’, named in the second to last unit of 
this book as “messianische Politik,” implying the existence of something we 
might call ‘messianic action’.  
At the beginning of this unit, Rosenzweig attempts to explain the ‘messianic 
protocol’ as such, through an important explanation about the Jewish people, 
finally “at its goal” (am Ziel): “In the cycle of its year the future is the motive 
power; the circular movement does not give birth as it were by push (durch Stoß), 
but by tug (sondern durch Zug); the present elapses, not because the past shoves 
it forward, but because the future drags it along.”11 Rosenzweig additionally 
explains the difference between the words Stoß and Zug, both carrying multiple 
meanings, in the second part of the sentence: the present elapses primarily 
because the future drags it along (die Zukunft sie [die Gegenwart] heranreißt). 
The future being strength (the future does not contain strength, but is strength, 
says Rosenzweig) pulls out the present. The construction of this sentence, in 
which the ‘messianic topology’, and in general ‘messianic action’ or ‘messianic 
movement’, is ‘most clearly’ described, can perhaps be part of an ideal 
introduction into the theory of messianic time. Rosenzweig’s contribution and 
                                                 
10 “Und die Gesänge des „dritten Mahls“, zu dem sich im Dämmer des versinkenden Tages Greise und 
Kinder am langen gedeckten Tische vereinen, sind ganz trunken von dem Rausch der gewißlich 
nahenden Zukunft des Messias” [SE1 393; SE 347; SG 332]. 
11 “In dem Kreislauf seines Jahres ist die Zukunft die bewegende Kraft; die kreisende Bewegung entsteht 
gewissermaßen nicht durch Stoß, sondern durch Zug; die Gegenwart verstreicht, nicht weil die 
Vergangenheit sie weiterschiebt, sondern weil die Zukunft sie heranreißt.“ [SE1 412; SE 364; SG 348] 
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decisive turn is not achieved by simply opposing the strength of the future to that 
of the past, nor by the substitution of two forms of movement (‘pushing’ with 
‘pulling’), but by the use of the word Zug (sondern durch Zug). Rosenzweig’s 
durch Zug assumes a sudden and surprising pulling out of something hidden, 
something from a hole. ‘The messianic’ is double: it is always present as hidden 
in the now (“today is not yet the true ‘Today’”), and it appears suddenly and from 
a spasm.  
The third and fourth group of concepts is particularly interesting. 
Rosenzweig incorporates them into the ‘We axle’ as two dimensions that are new 
and crucial for the ontology of the eternal flame that constitutes itself. The third 
group refers to the ‘community’, and comprises three passages subsequently 
entitled with ‘sociology’. In it, the community is elaborated in detail. (Three other 
sections of the second book of the third part of Stern are entitled ‘sociology.) The 
fourth group of terms could be reduced to the name ‘state’ or potentially ‘of the 
world’, rather than politics or ‘messianic politics’. 
Three chapters of the second edition carry titles containing the word 
‘sociology’: “Soziologie der Menge: das Hören” (Sociology of The Crowd: 
Listening – not capitalized in the original edition), “Soziologie der Gemeinschaft: 
das Mahl” (Sociology of The Community), and finally “Soziologie des Ganzen: 
der Gruss” (Sociology of The Whole: The Greeting). These last two have a 
reduced status in comparison to the other six units of the book. With these three, 
Rosenzweig is attempting to reconstruct the community (or ‘Jewish community’) 
by way of a few sub-concepts. These are ‘silence’, ‘listening’, ‘meal’, ‘greeting’, 
‘rest’, and ‘discipline’. (I believe these terms to be more significant over all the 
others that occur more than once.) All these protocols produce a network that 
constitutes a community, connect individuals into a ‘We’. Rosenzweig’s 
originality in this respect is to introduce into social ontology something entirely 
new and surprising, which he has drawn from living Jewish tradition, its laws and 
mandates. 
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‘Silence’. Even when speaking of holy language, Rosenzweig insists on “the 
power of silence” (Macht des Schweigens). “With his brother he therefore cannot 
speak at all; with him the glance informs him better than the word, and there is 
nothing more deeply Jewish than a final suspicion of the power of the word and 
a heart-felt confidence in the power of silence.” [SE1 380; SE 335; SG 321]. What 
is the function of the word or of dialogue, and what is role of “mutual silence (das 
gemeinsame Schweigen)? At the beginning of unit 5, he writes: “Because in 
eternity the word ceases to exist in the silence of the harmonious gathering (im 
Schweigen des einträchtigen Beisammenseins) – for we are united only in silence; 
the word unites, but those who are united grow silent (denn nur im Schweigen ist 
man vereint, das Wort vereinigt, aber die Vereinigten schweigen) – therefore the 
burning mirror that collects the sunbeams of eternity in the tiny cycle of the year, 
the liturgy, must introduce man into this silence” [SE1 388; SE 343; SG 327].  
‘Listening’. The brief chapter “Soziologie der Menge: das Hören” sketches 
a theory of listening that leads to the community of all who listen a written text. 
Rosenzweig presents his own experience of lecturing: “The sermon like the text 
read aloud is itself there to produce the mutual silence of the gathered community 
(Die Predigt wie der verlesene Text selber ist dazu da, das gemeinsame 
Schweigen der versammelten Gemeinde zu schaffen). And its essence is therefore 
not that it is a speech but exegesis; the reading out of the written word is the main 
thing (die Verlesung des Schriftworts ist die Hauptsache); in it alone the mutuality 
of the listening (die Gemeinsamkeit des Hörens) and hence the firm ground of all 
the mutuality of those gathered (Gemeinsamkeit der Versammelten) is produced” 
[SE1 389; SE 344; SG 329]. Learning how to listen means learning in a way that 
does not stimulate speaking or the speech of one speaking; rather, listening such 
that the answer is relinquished while simultaneously encouraging all to listen 
(each other). “The silent listening (Das schweigende Hören) was only the 
beginning of the mutual participation” [SE1 395; SE 349; SG 334]. 
‘Rest’. The chapter that speaks of rest (Ruhe) (which also unifies) is specific 
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in that Rosenzweig uses the word ‘Einsetzung’ to mean Sabbat three times (the 
word is usually translated with ‘institution’), and only on the fourth occasion 
insisting that in the house “the day of rest instituted” (der Ruhetag eingesetzt) 
[SE1 395; SE 348; SG 333]. Rest means to reacquaint oneself once again with 
silence and listening, eschewing idle chatter.  
‘Meal’. Each of these terms align and gather into a community of all. In the 
unit entitled “Soziologie der Gemeinschaft: das Mahl” (Sociology of the 
Community: The Meal) all these terms finally combine to participate equally in 
the order of the house: “The mutual life (Das gemeinsame Leben) that is thus born 
is to be a silent life (ein schweigendes Leben), living silence (lebendiges 
Schweigen); so we can only wait to find it in bodily life (leiblichen Leben). The 
creation in another way, the exchanging of the out-dated material takes place in 
the meal. For the individual, eating and drinking are already the new birth of the 
bodily man (leiblichen Menschen). For the community, the meal together 
(gemeinsame Mahl) is also the treatment in which it is born again to conscious 
life (bewußten Leben). The silent mutuality of listening and obeying already 
founds the smallest of communities, that of the home” (Die schweigende 
Gemeinsamkeit des Hörens und Gehorchens stiftet schon die kleinste 
Gemeinschaft, die des Hauses). This addition and new term appearing in the 
home simultaneously with the appearance of the meal and common feast – 
‘obeying’ – is immediately deconstructed, with Rosenzweig insisting that all are 
equal at the table, that “the mutual life of the home does not live in the mutual 
obeying.” Most importantly, however, at the table, there is no conversation. 
“Speaking can be done in the street and marketplace with chance meetings; in 
comparison, a meal together always means a real, realized and active community 
(eine wirkliche, bewirkte und wirkende Gemeinschaft). In this wordless mutuality 
in itself of the meal is taken mutually, the mutuality is presented as a real mutual 
participation animated in life (Gemeinschaft als eine wirkliche im Leben 
lebendige dargestellt). Where a meal is taken together, there such mutual 
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participation exists. It is so in the home, but so too in monasteries, lodges, casinos, 
associations. And where mutual participation is lacking, as in classrooms or even 
in just university lectures, or even seminar practices, it does not exist, although 
the foundation of mutual participation (das wirkliche Gemeinschaftsleben), the 
mutual listening is indeed by all means here” [SE1 396; SE 349-350; SG 334]. 
‘Greeting’. In the conclusion of the fifth unit, in which he states that during 
holidays the community celebrates itself at mealtime, Rosenzweig also warns that 
“mans has as little stopped at the inn of the mutuality of the last silence as in the 
holidays of the mutual listening” (der Mensch schon in die Gemeinsamkeit des 
letzten Schweigens eingekehrt). There is something higher, he adds, “and this that 
is higher may even be located at the outermost border of the mutual participation 
and be mutuality beyond the mutual life” (und sei dies Höhere auch an der 
äußersten Grenze der Gemeinschaft gelegen und eine Gemeinsamkeit jenseits des 
gemeinsamen Lebens) [SE1 403; SE 357; SG 340-341]. What is this ‘higher’, and 
what is at the border of the community? Rosenzweig differentiates the silence of 
listeners to lectures, which is the silence of each individual separately, from the 
silence during mealtime, in which others cease to be others. “One is greeted when 
encountered (Man grüßt sich, wenn man sich begegnet). The greeting is the 
supreme sign of silence (höchste Zeichen des Schweigens): they are silent because 
they know each other (man schweigt, weil man einander kennt). (…) Only if 
everything were silent would the silence be perfect and the mutual participation 
all-mutual (die Gemeinschaft all-gemein). The greeting of all to all (Aller an Alle), 
wherein this fully mutual silence would show itself, would have, like every 
greeting would have at least one’s announcement and the exchange of a few 
words, the mutual listening and the mutual meal as the supposition. But how is 
this greeting of all to all supposed to happen?” (Wie aber soll dieser Gruß Aller 
an Alle geschehen?) [SE1 403; SE 357-358; SG 341]. 
‘Discipline’. Rosenzweig’s example of a higher order, disciplined 
community, one containing “the greeting of all to all” (Aller an Alle) is the 
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military. Soldiers or “comrades” ought to achieve the greatest unity in discipline. 
This is Rosenzweig’s introduction “into the universal mutual participation 
(Allgemeinschaft) where everyone knows everyone and greets him without words 
– face to face” (von Angesicht zu Angesicht) [SE1 406; SE 359; SG 343]. 
‘Discipline’ is here a new and auxiliary term that first appears at the moment 
where Rosenzweig needs to explain what is obedience, mentioning “die Zucht 
des gemeinsamen Gehorchens geben” (the discipline of mutual obeying).12 “But 
what it does not give is the feeling of freedom that only a mutual life conjures up 
before the never dwindling background of this mutual discipline (das vor dem nie 
schwindenden Hintergrunde jener gemeinsamen Zucht: erst ein gemeinsames 
Leben hervorzaubert). Such a mutual life as it is presented in the meal together is 
also not yet that which is last, as little as is the listening together (gemeinsame 
Hören). But on the road of education toward this last, the mutual silence 
(gemeinsamen Schweigen), this is the second halting-place (die zweite Station), 
while the listening is the first one” [SE1 397; SE 351; SG 335]. Discipline or a 
disciplined military as a new and higher constitution of a people as an armed 
group or a people as an army is condition upon Rosenzweig’s remark that 
common meal determines a people to be free, which instantly opens up the danger 
of begin destroyed. The community achieved in common mealtime as a symbol 
of freedom and independence necessarily implies danger. “Not only today have 
there been rebellions against us to annihilate us, but in each generation back to 
that first one that migrated from Egypt—and in each generation God has saved 
us” [SE1 400; SE 353; SG 337]. 
The fourth group of terms appears in the finale of this book, unit seven, “Die 
Völker der Welt: Messianische Politik” (The Peoples of The World: Messianic 
Politics). These are: ‘(holy) war’, ‘pacifist’ or ‘pacifism’, ‘people’, ‘peace’, 
‘world’, ‘state’, ‘right’, ‘violence’. Rosenzweig’s great project on the war is here 
                                                 
12 I have modified the English translation here, replacing the word ‘cultivation’ with ‘discipline’. 
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condensed and abandoned for good in favor of a form of pacifism or a “messianic 
dilemma” with regard to pacifism that decisively orients the holy people. The war 
project – let us call it “war” and accept that it was nothing but an ingenious project 
– was given different code names by Rosenzweig: “Kriegsopera,” “Putzianum,” 
“Hansiaca,” “Kriegsausgang,” and “Kriegsgrund,” as well as “Theatrum 
Europaeum. Ein Versuch über den Schauplatz der Weltgeschichte.”13 After many 
twists and turns, and many attempts – lest we forget, in August and September 
1916, Rosenzweig is convinced that pacifism ought to be abandoned because 
“ultimate peace” (Endfrieden) is not man’s work (Menschenwerk) but a direct act 
of God (Einwirkung Gottes) [GS1 204], while in December of 1922 he still 
mentions the inadequacy of believing in pacifism and the power of “spiritual 
arms” [GS1 874] – perhaps it is now possible to insist on two of Rosenzweig’s 
suggestions. Both suggestions about the role of pacifism in war (“messianic and 
world war”) are based in his acceptance of violence, and the belief that it is really 
possible to achieve by means of war something not otherwise achievable by 
peaceful means (based on his theory of two peaces or two kinds of pacifism). 
Hence, Rosenzweig is completely certain, as is Walter Benjamin for example, that 
violence can make something (that violence makes a new right or justice, or that 
by way of violence an old justice becomes some new justice) [SE1 418; SE 370; 
                                                 
13 In the three letters sent to three different address in the first half of 1917, Rosenzweig explains in 
detail the origin of his idea for a big book on the war and says he has begun writing, aware that he 
would be unable to finish the whole project during his time on the front. For us it is certainly important 
to notice that “Globus,” conspicuously longer than the other ten, is the basic part of the first projected 
book, and that the other texts are miniature pieces and portions of that same big book. He tells us that 
in 1910 or 1911, while writing his thesis on Hegel and the state, he intended to write the history of 
grounds for war (Kriegsgrund). He hastens to finish his doctorate so as to dedicate himself to this task, 
since on 25 November 1910, Carnegie established a foundation financing projects that deal with the 
causes and origins of war. In the three letters of January, March and May of 1917 [GS1 334-335, 375, 
395] Rosenzweig offers a few more details: that he wished to analyze wars from 1494 until today, that 
he is particularly interested in the relationship between the grounds for war (Kriegsgründen) and 
beginning of war (Kriegsanfängen). He adds that he writes primarily about what is currently taking 
place, that previously he wished to work in diplomatic archives and examine everything that grounds 
war, that is, the reasoning that would lead to the beginning of wars. Yet, he also says that he could never 
write such a book at present, that if he were to write it now, it would be part of some larger book, which 
demands even more time. Ultimately, this is why he must ‘abort’ the book… 
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SG 352-353]. Also, the geopolitical construction helps Rosenzweig claim that 
only by means of war could the transition of national states and Europe be 
completed into the planet and the world (war as transition). It also allows him to 
claim war as a sort of subject (God), deciding on its own beginning, duration and 
end (“Der Krieg ist der große Entscheider“).14 In an unusually important and 
detailed letter to his parents from 1 September 1916 [GS1 210-214], he writes 
about peace before (on the brink) of a possible war, that is of peace that exists in 
paradise (paradiesischen) and of the peace after the war (or wars) that exists in 
the time of the Messiah and the thousand year reign. The first peace (the natural 
state or natural peace), taken care of by the so-called materialist pacifism, is a 
peace between creations and things that have no connection among themselves, 
where the frictions and tears are brought to a minimum, and identities and entities 
are completely separated one from another. In international relations, such a 
peace is founded on a tolerance of all peoples. The second peace, or the second 
world peace, the idealistic, messianic (idealistischen, messianischen), around 
which idealistic pacifism is organized, arrives after the last war. (Rosenzweig 
notes that it is advocated by German thinkers.) Such peace means a close 
connection of people and peoples, questions the reasons behind wars, and tries to 
transform them into reasons for peace and a new life of togetherness. The 
condition of this new peace and the stake of idealistic pacifism, according to 
Rosenzweig, is the last war.  
This also shows, continues Rosenzweig, that the national and liberal states 
are in their beginnings (in ihren Anfängen) einen pazifistischen Zug. Both of these 
formulations, the pessimistic – that pacifism does not achieve true world peace 
and freedom, but only imperial peace determined by borders and governments, 
                                                 
14 Cf. Rosenzweig often speaks of war that decides and judges, mostly in the texts “Globus” and “Vox 
Dei,” “Die Gewissensfrage der Demokratie.” [GS3 279] “Der Krieg ist ein “göttliches Gericht”, aber 
kein einfaches Strafgericht, sondern “Krisis,” Scheidung, Böcke und Schafe” [GS1 350]. In Stern he 
writes: “Der Krieg allein, der über das Bewußtsein der Einzelnen hinwegrast, entscheidet.” [SE1 416; 
SE 367-368; SG 351]. 
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and the optimistic, whereby (“idealistic”) pacifism is the part of the war machine 
that tears down state borders – alter the meaning of the phrase “pazifistischer 
Zug.” The idea (of the national or liberal state) does not contain the Zug, but is 
the Zug. And it is the Zug at its very beginning, at the moment of its constituting. 
However, that which is at the beginning of its constitution is also really the 
beginning of its future end. To be or to have “pazifistischer Zug” means at the end 
to cease to be or cease having sovereignty – not being a national state. Thus, in a 
different register, Rosenzweig finds within (the main characteristics of) the state 
– violence, war, and revolution – precisely those elements that will completely 
destroy the state. “Pazifistischer Zug,” as a deconstructive or affirmative element 
found within the construction and foundation of the national state itself, is 
foreshadowed in several places in “The Peoples of the World: Messianic Politics.” 
This is done as Rosenzweig, with surprising inspiration, speaks of the state and 
of the Jewish people’s resistance to having their own state, as well of the Jews 
(potentially) belonging to the peoples of the world due to this state. He reveals 
that there is something which contradicts the Jewish people within the state, 
something alternative, which, paradoxically, has the power to take away eternity 
from the eternal people. And he confirms the potential of the state to achieve 
something new and alternative (“if the State could get what it is reaching for”), 
and as a result “the people have become master over its enemy” [SE1 420; SE 
371; SG 354]. Is a possible “Pazifistischer Zug” of the state of Israel not indicated 
by this? 
But who reveals world peace and who is the ideal subject of pacifism? Who 
should be the agent of this process, according to Rosenzweig? 
 
Opposite this constant life in the war of faith (Glaubenskrieg), the Jewish 
people has its war of faith behind it in a mythic past. Therefore, all wars that 
is still experiences are purely political wars (rein politische Kriege) for it. 
And since it does possess the concept of the war of faith, it therefore cannot 
take them seriously, like the ancient peoples for whom this concept was 
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foreign (fremd). Of course, the Jew is really the only man in the Cristian 
world who cannot take war seriously, and therefore is the only genuine 
“pacifist.” (...) by living the eternal peace, the Jewish people stands outside 
of a warlike temporality (kriegerischen Zeitlichkeit); by resting at the goal 
that it anticipates in hope, it is separated from the march of those who draw 
near to it in the toil of centuries.15 
 
“Der Jude ist der einzige echte ‛Pazifist’.” “Ja der Jude ist eigentlich der 
einzige Mensch in der christlichen Welt, der den Krieg nicht ernst nehmen kann, 
und so ist er der einzige echte ‛Pazifist’.” The Jew is the real or the authentic 
“pacifist,” because he cannot take seriously the wars Christian states lead one 
with another. Twice Rosenzweig underscores that the Jew “cannot” accept or give 
meaning to these political wars. They are foreign to him because they do not 
belong to the register or notion (Begriff) of religious wars. Regardless of the fact 
that in the chapter “War of Faith,” which precedes this fragment, he says that as 
opposed to Christians, the Jewish people knows both types of war, and is the 
guardian of the knowledge of difference between them, and regardless of the fact 
that Rosenzweig unveils the possibility of existence of a another, “third” type of 
war (in which the religious and political are mixed) – the Jewish people remains 
completely outside the world, and outside “war temporality” (kriegerischen 
Zeitlichkeit). There are wars between states and peoples (in which peoples risk 
being annihilated. This is the main characteristic of so-called “political” wars: 
they are decided in a miraculous, completely mysterious way, by “God’s will” or 
“war alone,” and are beyond the consciousness of individuals. Is it really possible 
that such wars are completely without relevance for Rosenzweig, for a Jew? Did 
Rosenzweig’s entire effort not precisely consist of the attempt to bridge the strict 
distinction between two kinds of wars within the Jewish political tradition, and 
to construct or renew the idea of last, messianic wars? If we leave aside his 
doubts, the dissatisfaction with the end of World War I and his abandonment of 
                                                 
15 [SE1 416; SE 368; SG 351]. 
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the Kriegsgrund project, what does it even mean to disregard political wars and 
to be the only genuine “pacifist?” 
It seems to me that the correct answers to these difficult questions could 
justify not only the relevance of Rosenzweig’s “argumentations” in favor of war 
(they are rather “argument sketches,” intuitions, suggestions), but could also 
explain another epoch in the history of the Jewish people, which Rosenzweig did 
not have in mind – the Holocaust, forming of the state of Israel, its wars, new 
(preventive, asymmetrical) wars for world governance, etc. Although his political 
manifesto “The Peoples of the World: Messianic Politics” places the Jewish 
people beyond any state or conflict among states of the world, perhaps it may be 
possible to defend the consistency and logic of his project by “inscribing” the 
existence of the state of Israel into it. In the same vein, it seems important to 
espouse the paradoxical harmony of his project with the changes in the world that 
happened after his death.  
The defense of Rosenzweig’s engagement within a complex Jewish 
political tradition could move in three steps. The first step looks at the statement 
“Der Jude ist der einzige echte ‛Pazifist’.” Purified of Rosenzweig’s ambiguous 
use of quotation marks over the word pacifist and the controversial proximity of 
the words genuine and pacifist – is the Jew the only true and authentic pacifist or 
the only true and authentic “pacifist” (in the latter case, he is the only true pseudo-
pacifist, or the real pacifist who is not a pacifist, a “militant pacifist”)? – brings 
us back to the key word der einzige. Only the Jew is the true idealistic pacifist. In 
that context, the Jew is not interested in purely political wars, but what follows: 
true “Peace at all cost” which interrupts them. God (war) decides on its end, that 
is, the Messiah turns political wars into last wars, finally bringing about eternal 
peace. 
Second step: Rosenzweig de facto guards the difference between religious 
war and ordinary war (gewöhnlichen Kriegs) [SE1 416; SE 367; SG 350]. 
Nevertheless, he very carefully opens up an uncertain field where this difference 
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could be reduced. The existence of a large world war allows Rosenzweig to 
construct the idea of a political war or wars that cannot be interrupted before they 
become last and messianic wars. Only the last war can ever stop, and only when 
God’s will brings it to an end or when the enemy unconditionally accepts peace. 
This is a novelty in the history of thought and justification of war. 
Third step: A new world war, and the existence of the state of Israel and its 
wars, does not necessarily have to degrade Rosenzweig’s project, nor the 
greatness of a people that was once “its goal.” The issue is neither the closing nor 
the expansion of a particular state, but primarily a new speeding up of world 
history...the renewal of what Rosenzweig once, a long time ago, called 
pazifistischer Zug. 
 
